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CONTROVERSY

— ON THE —

Constitutions of the Jesuits

— BETWEEN —

DR. LITTLEDALE

— AND —

FR. DRUMMOND.

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15 CENTS.

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Dr. Littledale and the Jesuit Constitutions.

A short time ago a letter on "The Jesuits and their morality," written by Dr. Littledale, the author of the article on the Jesuits in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, was published in the *Ottawa Journal* by Dr. J. Beaufort Hurlbert, who has recently accepted the challenge issued by Father Whelan for proof that the maxim "the end justifies the means" is virtually embodied in the teachings of the Jesuit order. This article, it will be remembered, was referred to by Father Drummond in the lecture on the Jesuits he delivered in St. Mary's church, Winnipeg, on Whitsunday last. In his lecture Father Drummond charged that, in order to prove his point that "the end justified the means" was incorporated in the Jesuit Constitutions, Dr. Littledale had been guilty of deliberate mistranslation and falsification of the Latin text. A memorandum of that part of Father Drummond's discourse relating to Dr. Littledale's article was forwarded to the latter gentleman by some of his Winnipeg friends, and a reply from him to Father Drummond's strictures has lately been received, to which a rejoinder has been just made by Father Drummond. In view of the attention at present being manifested in the Dominion regarding the Jesuit question and the local interest concerning the point in dispute excited by Father Drummond's lecture, especially among classical scholars, the controversy is here published.

DR. LITTLEDALE'S CHARGE.

(Extract from *Ottawa Evening Journal*, May 18th, 1889.)

One charge which has been steadily advanced against the Jesuits for more than two centuries, and which they repel with admirably simulated indignation, is that of teaching that "the end justifies the means," that evil may be done with a good object, and they steadfastly deny the authenticity of quotations to this effect from Jesuit writers.

And yet the plain fact is, not merely that individual Jesuits have given currency to this maxim in their writings, all of which are subjected to a censorship of the press far stricter than even that prevalent for other Roman Catholic authors of theological works, but that the maxim itself is virtually embodied in a salient paragraph of the charter of the Society, the constitutions themselves. True, it is not expressed in the precise form just mentioned, but it shall now be cited textually, first in the original Latin from a volume entitled "Constitutiones Societatis

Jesu," dated Rome, 1570, and printed "cum facultate Superiorum." It is the fifth chapter of the sixth part of the Constitutions, and runs thus :

"Quod Constitutiones peccati obligationem non inducunt, Cap. V. Cum exoptet Societas universas suas Constitutiones, Declarationes, ac vivendi ordinem omnino juxta nostrum Institutum, nihil ulla in re declinando, observari; oportet etiam nihilominus suos omnes securos esse, vel certe adjuvari, ne in laqueum ullius peccati, quod ex vi Constitutionum hujusmodi, aut ordinationum proveniat, incidant; Visum est nobis in Domino praeter expressum Votum, quo Societas Summo Pontifici pro tempore existenti tenetur, ac tria alia essentialia Paupertatis, Castitatis, et Obedientiae, nullas Constitutiones, Declarationes, vel ordinem ullum vivendi posse obligationem ad peccatum mortale vel veniale inducere; *nisi Superior ea in nomine Domini nostri Jesu Christi, vel in virtute sanctae obedientiae juberet; quod in rebus, vel personis illis, in quibus judicabitur, quod ad particularem uniuscujusque, vel ad universale bonum multum conveniet, fieri poterit; et loco timoris offensae succedat amor omnis perfectionis et desiderium: ut major gloria et laus Christi Creatoris ac Domini nostri consequatur.*"

The translation of this passage is as follows :

"That the Constitutions involve no obligation to commit sin. Although the Society desires all its Constitutions, Declarations, and order of life to be observed according to our institute, in no wise deviating in any matter; it is nevertheless fitting that all its members should be secured, or at least aided, against falling into the snare of any sin, which may arise from the force of its Constitutions or injunctions: It seems good to us in the Lord that, excepting the express Vow whereby the Society is bound to the Supreme Pontiff for the time being, and the three other essential vows of Poverty, Chastity and Obedience, no Constitutions, Declarations or any order of living can involve obligation to sin, mortal or venial: *unless the Superior command them in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, or in virtue of holy obedience; which shall be done in those cases or persons, wherein it shall be judged that it may be done in order to contribute greatly to the particular good of each singly, or that of all; and instead of the fear of offence, let the love and desire of all perfection succeed; that the greater glory and praise of Christ our Creator and Lord may follow.*"

Here, then, is the principle explicitly laid down, that when the Superior is of opinion that a sinful act may prove advan-

tageous, then the Jesuit who is commanded to commit it must do so. But those who are unacquainted with the Jesuit system may naturally ask: "Has he not the option of refusal?" To that question the Constitutions themselves supply a complete answer. First, candidates who do not appear likely to be obedient, who do not subject their own opinions and judgment, are to be dismissed, in accordance with Part II, chapter 2 of the Constitutions. Next the twenty-third and twenty-fourth rules for the training of probationers run thus:

"It is especially conducive to improvement, and very necessary, that all should yield themselves up to perfect obedience, recognising the Superior (whoever he may be) as in the place of Christ our Lord, and regarding him with inward reverence and affection, nor merely obeying him in the outward execution of his injunctions fully, promptly, vigorously and with fitting humility, without excuses and murmurings, though he may command things difficult and repugnant to their feelings; but shall also strive to have inwardly resignation of their own will and judgment [*see second comparative table, p. 25, for passage omitted here*] and they are to accustom themselves not to consider who it is whom they obey, but rather Him for Whom and to Whom they obey in all things, which is Christ the Lord."—Const. III. 1.

Thirdly, the explanation of the scope and force of the vow of obedience contains the following clause, in perfect accordance with the whole context:

"And let each be persuaded that they who live under obedience ought to suffer themselves to be moved and guided by Divine Providence through their Superiors as if they were a dead body, which allows itself to be moved anywhere and handled anyhow; or as the staff of an old man, which serves him who holds it in his hand, wherever and for whatever purpose he chooses to employ it." Const. VI. 1.

And as a process most skilfully contrived for breaking down and subjugating the will is brought unremittingly to bear upon the probationer during his protracted noviciate, it may be readily understood that there is no probability of disobedience to any command of a Superior, whatever be its moral character.

FATHER DRUMMOND'S ANSWER.

Memorandum of reply made by Rev. Father Drummond, S. J., to a portion of Dr. Littledale's article on "The Jesuits and their Morality" in a sermon preached at St. Mary's Church, Winnipeg, on Sunday, June 9, 1889.

Father Drummond said the charges against the Jesuits' morality had been frequently refuted, and he referred specially to "Dishonest Criticism," a book written by Father Jones, of

St. Beuno's College, North Wales, which shows that none of the texts from their theological writers which are quoted against them in this connection bear the meaning placed upon them by their opponents.

With regard to the contention of Dr. Littledale that the maxim "The end justifies the means" is virtually embodied in the constitutions of the society, Father Drummond charged that Dr. Littledale is guilty of a deliberate mistranslation in order to establish this point. Appended is Father Drummond's translation, in which are pointed out the errors in Doctor Littledale's. Instead of "*Quod constitutiones peccati obligationem non inducunt*" meaning "That the constitutions involve no obligation to commit sin," it means that they do not "bind under penalty of sin." Dr. Littledale, said Father Drummond, has made the mistake of supposing that the genitive possesses no more than one meaning, that is, simply "of," whereas it sometimes means quite the opposite. As an instance he quoted the phrase "*Amor Dei*" which means either "the love of God for me" or "my love for God." Compare "*Victoria Germanorum*," which means both a victory *over* the Germans and a victory *won* by the Germans.

Further on, the Constitutions state that, excepting the express vow whereby the society is bound to the Supreme Pontiff and the three other essential vows of poverty, chastity and obedience, "*nullas constitutiones, declarationes, vel ordinem ullum vivendi posse obligationem ad peccatum mortale vel veniale inducere*," unless the superior commands them in the name of Our Lord Jesus Christ or in virtue of holy obedience. The words in Latin Dr. Littledale translates "no constitutions, declarations or any order of living can involve obligation *to sin*, mortal or venial." Father Drummond stated this should be "involve obligation extending *as far as* (or under pain of) sin." The effect of these differences is that, while Dr. Littledale would have that the constitutions permit the commission of sin, when ordered by the superior, Father Drummond contends the interpretation is that, although the constitutions and rules of the society are to be kept carefully by each member, failure to observe them, except the vows respecting the Pope and poverty, chastity and obedience, is not a sin, unless a special command for the particular observance of any one shall have been made by the superior in the name of Jesus Christ or of holy obedience. Such a special command has, said Father Drummond, never been issued to him,—although he has been more than twenty-one years in the order in Canada, the United States, England, Ireland and France,—and he knows of but two instances where it has been issued, during those

twenty-one years, in the case of others. Father Drummond pointed out that the same provision Dr. Littledale takes exception to is in the constitutions of every order founded since the Jesuit Society was organized, and in those of some founded before it, and he quoted from the constitutions of the Oblate Fathers in support of this. Not only is there no license to commit sin when so commanded, but it is provided in several places in the Constitutions that, if a member is sure anything leads to sin, he must not do it. Dr. Littledale, in translating from the twenty-third and twenty-fourth rules for the training of probationers—Const. III., 1, leaves out (33 words from the end of the quotation), without even a comma to show that there is an omission, a passage of 90 Latin words, amongst which are the following: “conforming wholly their will and judgment with that which the superior wills and judges in all things *where sin is not apparent* (or discernible)—*ubi peccatum non cerneretur*.” (See p. 25.) Moreover Fr. Drummond, in proof of the Society’s horror for sin, mentioned the fact that a distinguished member of the order was wired out of the Society by the General thereof for telling a lie in a matter of importance. In the event of any one being commanded to do wrong, there would be no need of any appeal, for all his fellow Jesuits would stand by him in his refusal to obey. But such a case has never come within Father Drummond’s purview either in history or tradition.

As for the quotation from Const. VI., 1, Father Drummond remarked that the simile of allowing one’s self to be moved like a dead body or handled as the staff in the hand of an old man is a very well known one; and it is not, after all, so terrible. It is merely the same kind of passive obedience a soldier has to yield his superior officer, which no one regards as conducive to lax morality; indeed the prompt and cheerful obedience of soldiers to their officers is a subject of commendation rather than censure.

Father Drummond did not refer to any of Dr. Littledale’s quotations from Jesuit theologians, because, said he, detailed controversy did not enter into the scope of his lecture, and because the proof that Dr. Littledale was ignorant or dishonest or both at the very beginning of his plea must nullify the effect of all the rest in the eyes of men who value knowledge and sincerity above everything else in a writer from whom quotations must be taken on trust.

Father Drummond’s translation of the passage in dispute is as follows:—

“Chap. V. That the constitutions DO NOT INVOLVE A BINDING UNDER PENALTY OF SIN.

"WHEREAS the Society *earnestly* desires all its constitutions, declarations, and order of life to be observed *altogether* according to our Institute, in no wise deviating in any matter; WHEREAS nevertheless, it ALSO DESIRES that all its members should be *safe*, or at least aided, against falling into the snare of any sin, which may arise from the force of *such* constitutions or ordinances; it *has seemed good to us in the Lord*" [in Canon Littledale's translation this apodosis of the sentence has no connection with the two preceding clauses of the protasis, which in reality contain the double motive of the conclusion, viz.: that no rules shall bind under pain of sin unless the Superior expressly formulate his order "in the name of Our Lord," etc.] "that, excepting the express vow whereby the Society is bound to the Supreme Pontiff *existing at the time*, and the three other essential vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, no constitutions, declarations, *nor* any order of living can involve an obligation EXTENDING AS FAR AS (or UNDER PENALTY OF) mortal or venial sin" (i. e. in case the constitution, declaration or order be not carried out) ["under penalty of" is the translation into idiomatic English, "extending as far as" is the literal rendering of the *obligatio ad*, which might be rendered still more literally "*liability to the guilt of*."] An easy way of showing the absurdity of Canon L's translation is to apply it to the parallel clause "excepting the express vow . . . and the three other . . . vows"; since these vows are excepted, they do, on Canon L's theory, involve an obligation to commit sin; therefore perfect chastity is sinful. *Risum teneatis, amici!*]; "unless the Superior command them in the name of Our Lord Jesus Christ, or in virtue of [the word *holy* is not in the Latin text] obedience; which may be done in those cases or persons wherein it shall be judged that it will contribute greatly to the particular good of each singly, or *to that of all*; and let the love and desire of all perfection *take the place of* the dread of offending; that the greater glory and praise of Christ our Creator and Lord may follow."

N.B.—I have kept Canon L's words as far as possible; his minor slips are printed in italics; his huge blunders and the wilful interpolation of *oportet* for *optet* are printed in capitals.

L. DRUMMOND.

June, 1889.

DR. LITTLEDALE'S REJOINDER.

July 22, 1889.

DEAR SIR,—When your letter reached me a few days ago, I was at once too unwell and too much preoccupied to reply at once. But I now proceed to reply upon the questions you have laid before me.

I adhere to the correctness of my translation of the clause in the Constitutions of the Jesuits, on which I partly ground the assertion that the maxim "The end justifies the means" is a tenet of Jesuit morality.

I fully recognise the ingenuity, and even the plausibility, of Father Drummond's explanation, but I cannot reconcile it with the whole scope and context of the chapter in dispute, though it might conceivably stand if applied to one isolated clause alone. Accordingly, I proceed to cite it entirely:

"Quod Constitutiones peccati obligationem non inducunt.

Cap. V.

"Cum exoptet Societas universas suas Constitutiones, Declarationes, ac vivendi ordinem, omnino juxta nostrum Institutum, nihil ulla in re declinando, observari; oportet etiam nihilominus suos omnes securos esse, vel certe adjuvari, ne in laqueum ullius peccati, quod ex vi Constitutionum hujusmodi, aut ordinationum proveniat, incidant: Visum est nobis in Domino præter expressum Votum, quo Societas Summo Pontifici pro tempore existenti tenetur, ac tria alia essentialia Paupertatis, Castitatis et Obedientiae, nullas Constitutiones, Declarationes, vel ordinem ullum vivendi, posse obligationem ad peccatum mortale vel veniale inducere; Nisi Superior ea in Nomine Domini nostri Jesu Christi, vel in virtute sanctae obedientiae juberet; quod in rebus, vel personis illis, in quibus judicabitur, quod ad particularem (*sic*) uniuscujusque, vel ad universale bonum multum conveniet, fieri poterit; et loco timoris offensae succedat amor omnis perfectionis et desiderium: ut major gloria et laus Christi Creatoris ac Domini nostri consequatur."

This extract is part of the concluding section of the Sixth division of the Constitutions, and must be collated with the first chapter of the same division, which is concerned with defining those things which belong to obedience. A citation thence is accordingly added here:

"Ut sancta obedientia tum in executione, tum in voluntate, tum in intellectu, sit in nobis semper omni ex parte perfecta; cum magna celeritate, spiritali gaudio, et perseverantia, quicquid nobis injunctum fuerit, obeundo; *omnia justa esse, nobis persuadendo*; omnem sententiam ac judicium nostrum contrarium

caeca quadam obedientia abnegando, et id quidem in omnibus quae a Superiore disponuntur, ubi definiri non possit (quemadmodum dictum est) aliquod peccati genus intercedere. Et sibi quisque persuadeat, quod qui sub Obedientia vivunt, se ferri ac regi a divina Providentia per Superiores suos sinere debent, perinde ac si cadaver essent, quod quoquo versus ferri, et quacunque ratione tractari se sinit; vel similiter atque senis baculus, qui ubicunque et quacunque in re velit eo uti, ei inservit. Sic enim obediens rem quaecunque, cui cum Superior ad auxilium totius corporis Congregationis velit impendere, cum animi hilaritate debet exequi, ac omnino existimare, quod ea ratione potius quam re alia quavis, quam praestare possit propriam voluntatem ac iudicium diversum sectando, divinae voluntati respondebit."

I have first to say that these two quotations are *accurately conformable* with the text of the edition of the "Constitutiones Societatis Jesu" printed at Rome in 1570, and that my own copy has a MS inscription on the title-page thus: "Collegii Societ. Jesu Coloniae, 1622."

I now proceed to translate the two passages as literally as I can:

"Although the Society desires all its Constitutions, Declarations and order of life to be observed in every respect according to our Institute, with no deviation in any matter; it is nevertheless fitting that all its members should be secure, or at the least aided, lest they should fall into the snare of any sin which may originate from the force of its Constitutions or directions. It has seemed good to us in the Lord that, excepting the express vow by which the Society is bound to the Supreme Pontiff for the time being, and the three other essential vows of Poverty, Chastity and Obedience, no Constitutions, Declarations or any order of living can involve obligation to sin mortal or venial; unless the Superior command them in the name of Our Lord Jesus Christ, or in virtue of holy obedience; which may be done in those cases or persons wherein it shall be judged that it will greatly conduce to the particular good of each, or the general advantage; and instead of the fear of offence, let the love and desire of all perfection succeed, that the greater glory and praise of Christ our Creator and Lord may ensue."

"That holy obedience may be perfect in us, always in every particular, alike in execution, in will, and in understanding, doing with great celerity, spiritual joy and perseverance whatsoever is enjoined on us; *persuading ourselves that they are all just*; rejecting every contrary thought and judgment of our own with a certain blind obedience; and that

moreover in all things which are appointed by the Superior, wherein it cannot be defined (as is said) that any kind of sin comes in. And let each persuade himself that they who live under obedience ought to suffer themselves to be moved and directed by Divine Providence through their Superiors, as if they were a corpse, which allows itself to be moved and handled in any fashion; or as the staff of an old man, which serves him wherever and for whatever purpose he who holds it in his hand wishes to use it. For so he that obeys ought to execute with cheerfulness of mind anything on which the Superior wills to employ him for the assistance of the whole body of the Congregation, and to be entirely of opinion that he will answer the Divine will better in that way, than in any other way by following his own will and contrary judgment."

The first comment I have to make is that the translation tendered by Father Drummond of the words "*obligationem ad peccatum mortale vel veniale inducere*," as though they meant that neglect to obey the Constitutions, &c., is not to be held to amount to mortal or even venial sin, will not stand for a moment, simply because the formal and accredited phrase where such is the meaning has invariably the preposition "sub," and not "ad," employed, thus: "*Non obligat sub mortali*." The apparent refutation supplied by the argument that my translation—which alone squares with the Latin idiom—involves the absurdity that it would make the Constitutions allege that observance of the vow of chastity might be conceivably sinful, breaks down not only when it is noted that the obvious purpose of the clause as to the four vows is meant to put them entirely out of the debateable area, and to rule that no exceptions or relaxations of them can be anyhow taken into account, but also when it is remembered that there are conceivable situations when the observance of some of these rules might conflict with other precepts. Put the case of the sovereign of a kingdom who was also the last heir of line, and where a failure in the succession would involve a change of dynasty, or even allegiance, highly dangerous to the country: it is plain that the king who decided to hold by a vow of celibacy might be sinning very gravely against his public duties, which made him incompetent to pledge himself in such a fashion; and thus a vow of chastity might be sinful.

Those who will be at the pains to compare the two extracts I have brought together will see that the later of the two in order in the Constitutions (though the earlier as given above) is plainly intended to meet the difficulty of objections being raised

by scrupulous members of the Society against executing an order given them by a Superior, and is the complement of the injunction that they must assume every order so given to be lawful and right, and must reject every conflicting opinion of their own on the matter.

The hopeless untenability of Father Drummond's gloss will appear when it is noticed that, if it be allowed to stand, it is not even a venial sin for any member of the Jesuit body to violate its Constitutions, unless the particular Constitution concerned be specifically brought before him, and enjoined upon him by a special act of his Superior. That is sheer nonsense, and I need not waste my time over it.

I quite allow that if there were evidence in the writings and acts of members of the Jesuit body that the meaning I put upon these clauses in the Constitutions, as proving that the end justifies the means, has not been adopted by the Society, nor supported by its accredited authors, nor yet admitted into its practice, my case fails. But I allege that the maxim is definitely to be found in the writings of such well-known Jesuit authors as Busebaum, Wagemann and Gury; and that it has been so persistently acted on by the Society as to earn their expulsion from several States of Europe, as dangerous to society. And I say this, having myself had Jesuit friends whom I would have trusted confidently in any relation of life where their specific obligations did not intervene.

RICHARD F. LITLEDALE.

Father Drummond's Reply to Dr. Littledale's Rejoinder.

Dr. Littledale is, as usual, calmly ingenious and skilfully disingenuous. Of ingenuity the insertion of a fresh extract from the Constitutions and the introduction of a far-fetched case about celibacy are striking examples. Of disingenuousness I proceed to note several instances.

INDIRECT REFUTATION.

1. He has made a new translation of the controverted passage. In so doing he has altered his former version, in accordance with suggestions made in my translation, but *without any acknowledgment*. I remarked that the clause in Dr. Littledale's translation which began, after a colon, with the words, "it has seemed" (or "it seems") "good to us," had no connection with the two preceding clauses. Accordingly, in his fresh translation, Dr. Littledale puts a full stop before "It has seemed," thus, indeed, cutting off a part of my objection, but also flying

in the teeth of the Latin text, even as he gives it, and destroying the unity of the entire passage, which is one single sentence from beginning to end. The effect is simply to stultify "the whole scope and context of the chapter in dispute."

By underlining the word *may* towards the end of my translation I hinted that Dr. Littledale had no right to translate "*fieri poterit*" by "shall be done." Accordingly—though reluctantly, as the pen correction "may" of the already type-written "shall" shows (in the original)—he now says with me, "may be done."

2. Though I took care to capitalize the blunder, he persists in substituting, as the twenty-first word in the body of "Cap. V." *oportet* for *optet*, and he says nothing to justify this persistent divergence from the text I have before me. Only, in general, at the end of his two quotations, he says they "are *accurately conformable* with the text of the edition of the 'Constitutiones Societatis Jesu,' printed at Rome in 1570." Unfortunately for the value of this assertion, I have by me at this moment two of the most recent editions of our Constitutions, one printed at Avignon in 1827 and another printed at Rome in 1869; both these editions give *optet*. With these two editions in hand, I should be justified in waiving the 1570 version, and in taking my stand upon the Society's Constitutions as they are: for, as late as 1594, I find the representatives of the Society assembled in General Congregation (which is the supreme legislative body in our Order) recommending that the Latin edition of the Constitutions be corrected according to the Spanish original, a recommendation which had been repeatedly made in previous Congregations, and which points to the 1570, or second, edition as being decidedly inaccurate. (See *Institutum Societatis Jesu*, Rome 1869-70, Vol. I, pages 208, 230, 235, 239, 264). But though I have not the advantage, which Dr. Littledale has, of possessing the 1570 version, I have no doubt that the word in that version is *optet* and not *oportet*. Of this affirmation I have strong negative proof in the fact that Dr. Littledale, having before his eyes my doubly underlined version, "WHEREAS, nevertheless, it ALSO DESIRES," says not a word, as a scholar of his standing would naturally be expected to say, in astonishment at my translating his *oportet* by *desires*. Nor does he say anything of the final note in which I refer to this substitution as a "wilful interpolation." Evidently he has nothing to say, and so he ignores my correction, hoping that his general assurance of conformity with the text of 1570 will outweigh, in the minds of those for whom Dr. Littledale is still a truth-teller, that correction. Happily, counter-affirmation is not my

only resource; the intrinsic evidence of the text, as given by Dr. Littledale, also supports me. In Dr. Littledale's Latin text I read: "*oportet etiam nihilominus*;" which he translates thus: "it is nevertheless fitting." Why does he not translate the word *etiam*? Because the plain English word *also* would too readily betray the garbling of the Latin text. "Although the Society desires. . . .; it is nevertheless fitting *also*" would sound too ridiculous. *Also* cannot be used to qualify the principal verb of a second clause, unless there be some expression in the first clause resembling another expression in the second. In my text there is a similar verb: "*cum exoptet. . . . optet etiam*;" and therefore *also* is quite in order. But between *exoptet* and *oportet* there is no similarity of meaning, and therefore *etiam* is ridiculously out of place. Dr. Littledale apparently trusted that inaccurate scholarship would overlook this absurdity, and counted on escaping detection by not translating the tell-tale *etiam*.

One result of this perversion of the Latin text is, that Dr. Littledale's translation becomes exceedingly lame. I have already pointed out how, by beginning a new sentence at the words, "It has seemed," he destroys the necessary connection between this principal clause and those that go before it. I would now add that the absence of any inferential or adversative conjunction in the beginning of the Latin principal clause, "*visum est nobis in Domino etc.*," shows clearly that the *cum*, which begins "Cap. V," means, not *although*, as Dr. Littledale translates it, but *whereas*, as I translated it. For, if *cum* meant *although*, it would call for some corrective after "*visum est*," such as *tamen* or *nihilominus*. No corrective appears. Therefore *cum* introduces not an objection, but a motive for observing the Constitutions through "the love and desire of all perfection" rather than through "the fear of offending."

3. The next piece of disingenuousness in Dr. Littledale's letter is so full of ingenuity that it may be taken as a palmary instance of the fusion of these two characteristics. He is charged with deliberately omitting a whole passage which distinctly excludes sinful things from the sphere of obedience. (See page 5, line 9.) To this charge he replies *not one word*. But, perhaps in order indirectly to meet it, he quotes another passage where sin is again excluded. So as to find an excuse for this new quotation, he affirms that the extract, "Quod Constitutiones, etc.," is "*part* of the concluding section of the Sixth division of the Constitutions." Now it is not a *part*, but the *whole* of that concluding section. With the exception of the word *oportet* and

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the phrases *praeter expressum votum* and *tria alia essentialia*, which ought to be *optet. excepto expresso voto tribus aliis essentialibus*, Dr. Littledale quotes the *entire* fifth chapter or concluding section. He forgets that he has himself called attention, a few lines higher up, to the *entirety* of his quotation, his words then being: "Accordingly I proceed to cite it (the chapter in dispute) *entirely*."

Then again, he begins his quotation not at the beginning, but towards the end of a long sentence, after a comma, without a hint of the mutilation. In the 1869 edition the whole sentence covers 37 lines; Dr. Littledale quotes only 12 lines. Of course the omitted portion contains the very marrow of the Catholic doctrine of obedience, "that we must have before our eyes God our Creator and Lord, for Whose sake obedience is rendered to man," and "that we should be most ready at the call of obedience, just as if the voice issued from Christ the Lord." For Dr. Littledale's purpose these and other beautiful thoughts must be omitted; but what he was most careful to omit was the phrase which most distinctly points to the exclusion of sin, and which, standing as it does at the beginning of the practical provisions of this first chapter of the Sixth Part, modifies and controls all that follows. The phrase is, "*omnibus in rebus, ad quas potest cum charitate se obedientia extendere*," which means "in all things to which obedience may extend within the sphere of charity (or sanctifying grace)." As in many other passages of our Constitutions, so here in particular there is a marginal capital letter B referring to an explanatory note which explains the "*omnibus in rebus*" thus: "*Hujusmodi sunt illae omnes, in quibus nullum manifestum est peccatum*," i. e., "Of this nature are all those things in which no sin is apparent." A note of this kind is far more striking than a mere restrictive clause. It once more categorically puts sin out of court as an object of obedience. Dr. Littledale could not well ignore such a note, unless he ignored the text; therefore, he deliberately skips the premises and lands us without any warning in the middle of the conclusion.

DIRECT REFUTATION.

Fortunately, even in what he chooses to cite he furnishes me with powerful weapons of defence. Before exhibiting their temper, I must, however, notice the phrase he underlines, "*omnia justa esse nobis persuadendo*." His translation, "persuading ourselves that they are all just," is not grammatically correct: the word *they* connotes a plural noun for which it stands, whereas there is no such plural noun in the preceding part of

the sentence. To be sure, the idea to which *they* refers is contained in the phrase "whatsoever is [the Latin requires "shall have been"] enjoined on us;" but the correct rendering is, "persuading ourselves that all things are just." The underlining of this phrase by Dr. Littledale is intended to lay stress on what he afterwards describes as "the injunction that they must assume every order so given to be lawful and right." But, surely, Dr. Littledale has himself quoted other words which qualify this injunction most materially. The eleventh word after the underlined phrase begins a very important modification: "et id quidem in omnibus, quae a Superiore disponuntur, ubi definiri non possit ([f]quemadmodum dictum est) aliquod peccati genus intercedere." Let me first translate this correctly, before criticizing Dr. Littledale's version. A correct version is most important here, because this final clause modifies and limits the provisions of the entire sentence. Here, then, is a full rendering: "and that, *indeed*, [shall be done] in all things which are arranged by the Superior, wherever it cannot be defined (*as has been said above*) that any kind of sin comes in." Compare this with Dr. Littledale's version, and you will observe that he translates *quidem* by *moreover*, a restrictive particle by one which extends, instead of restricting, the meaning! You will observe also that he translates "quemadmodum dictum est" by the meaningless and incorrect phrase, "as is said." It is incorrect: since *dicitur*, not *dictum est*, is the Latin for "is said." It is meaningless: for, as it stands in the English, to what in the world can it refer? Perhaps to "it cannot be defined." If so, if Dr. Littledale meant to call attention to a peculiar use of the word "defined," then the parenthesis is worse than meaningless, it is misleading. The original text is perfectly clear. Just before the word "quemadmodum" the small italic letter *f* refers back to the note or "Declaratio B," which I have already translated, and which says that obedience embraces those things only "in which no sin is apparent." Consequently, to render fully the gist of the parenthesis, I deem it necessary to add the word *above*: "as has been said above." The result of Dr. Littledale's tinkering is to make the English version in this place unintelligible. We are at a loss to know if *that* in "and that moreover, etc." is a pronoun or a conjunction. If the reader takes it as a conjunction, he of course looks in vain for a final verb; but Dr. Littledale was quite willing he should suppose St. Ignatius wrote unfinished sentences, provided only that restrictive clause about excluding sin were properly muddled, and thus were sure to attract little or no attention.

And yet it is precisely that restrictive or modifying clause which takes the sting out of the phrase underlined by Dr. Little-

dale. We are told to "persuade ourselves that all things are just," provided there be question of "all those things in which no sin is apparent." This clearly implies that, when sin is apparent, we are not to persuade ourselves that everything is right. Nay more, as I have already shown when commenting on the explanatory note or "Declaratio B," this note positively excludes sin from the territory of obedience. It says equivalently: you are not at all called upon to obey a command to commit sin; sin cannot ever be the object of obedience. This is so elementary a principle with Catholics that I feel ashamed to have to insist upon it with such painful iteration. But I am forced to be tiresomely explicit in order to prove how unwarrantable is the conclusion which Dr. Littledale, who can be so clear and incisive when he chooses, has entangled in the following mazy sentence: "Those who will be at the pains to compare the two extracts I have brought together will see that the later of the two in order in the Constitutions (though the earlier as given above) is plainly intended to meet the difficulty of objections being raised by scrupulous members of the Society against executing an order given them by a Superior, and is the complement of the injunction that they must assume every order so given to be lawful and right, and must reject every conflicting opinion of their own on the matter." On the contrary, the fifth chapter, which Dr. Littledale quoted first, is not intended to meet objections of scrupulous Jesuits by telling them that they must, under certain circumstances, commit sin with an easy conscience. The plain intention of that chapter is to ease the conscience of all members by telling them plainly that, except certain vows and certain specially formulated orders, no rules bind them under penalty of any sin, and, therefore, that they should act habitually through a spirit of love for the glory of God and not through mere dread of sin. There is no question, in this fifth chapter, of meeting such objections as Dr. Littledale mentions: these have been fully met, as I have just proved, in two emphatic clauses of the first chapter. Nor is the fifth chapter, in any sense, a complement of the injunction to which Littledale refers. Not a single hint does it contain about "assuming every order to be lawful and right" or about "rejecting every conflicting opinion of their own." Finally, the corrective, not the complement, of that injunction, is given in those clauses of the first chapter which exclude sin. Thus, the inference Dr. Littledale would have the reader draw from these two extracts is in manifest opposition to the premisses contained in the extracts themselves. Its only possible purpose is to divert attention from the main issue of the present controversy.

That issue is contained in Dr. Littledale's paragraph about "the hopeless untenability" of my gloss. As I cannot decide whether ignorance or insincerity is the cause of the false assertion herein loftily thrown out, I will not characterize it more specifically than as a huge blunder. I certainly do hold that "it is not even a venial sin for any member of the Jesuit body to violate its Constitutions," except those vows which are excepted in Part VI., ch. 5, "unless the particular Constitution concerned be specifically brought before him and enjoined upon him by a special act of his superior." All the Jesuit body holds and has ever held the same doctrine. Other religious orders have the same provisions in their constitutions. The Catholic Church solemnly approves these provisions. Dr. Littledale's only answer is: "That is sheer nonsense, and I need not waste my time over it." Is this serious argument? Doubtless, a failure to observe one's rules is an imperfection, a lack of perfection; but it is not in itself a sin, mortal or venial, unless that rule be enjoined in virtue of obedience or in the name of Our Lord Jesus Christ.

In order to strengthen and complete the cumulative proof that this is the only meaning of chapter fifth, I now come to Dr. Littledale's comment on my translation of the words, "*obligationem ad peccatum mortale vel veniale inducere*." This is, of course, the crucial point of the whole discussion. I said, as Dr. Littledale for once correctly reports, that these words mean "that neglect to obey the constitutions," etc., except in specified cases, "is not to be held to amount to mortal or venial sin." This rendering, Dr. Littledale says, "will not stand for a moment, simply because the formal and accredited phrase, where such is the meaning, has invariably the preposition "sub" and not "ad," employed thus: '*non obligat sub mortali*.'" Did Dr. Littledale forget to read over his own letter? It would seem so: else, how could he so flatly contradict that one of his opening paragraphs in which he had said that my explanation "might conceivably stand?" Let us re-read this paragraph for him: "I fully recognize the ingenuity and even the plausibility of Father Drummond's explanation, but I cannot reconcile it with the whole scope and context of the chapter in dispute, though it might conceivably stand if applied to one isolated clause alone." If my explanation "might stand" when "applied to one isolated clause alone," then it is not true that "it will not stand for a moment" when nothing but that isolated clause is examined. In other words, Dr. L. begins by saying: your translation might possibly be good, if the clause were taken by itself. He ends by saying: your translation cannot possibly be good, if the clause be taken by itself. Why this self-contradiction? Because he set out with

great hopes of proving that the context of the chapter would demolish me. Later on, he must have felt those hopes were not realized. Hence he dropped the context and fastened on the clause too intently to remember his previous admission.

As to "the whole scope and context of the chapter in dispute," the arguments I have adduced so far tend to prove that Dr. Littledale has broken the whole chapter—one sentence in the original—into two independent propositions, has misrepresented the scope of the chapter, and has altered the original. I now add one more argument. According to Dr. Littledale's translation, all that is needed to make a Jesuit commit mortal or venial sin is an order from his superior uttered "in the name of Our Lord Jesus Christ." But, to use this Sacred Name as an instrument for sin is sacrilege and blasphemy. Therefore sacrilege and blasphemy are officially recognized in one of the most important chapters of the Constitutions. But these Constitutions have received the most solemn kind of approval from a score of Popes, and what Popes so solemnly approve is necessarily accepted by the whole Church. Therefore, the entire Roman Catholic Church is, not inadvertently and unwittingly, but logically and wittingly, wedded to sacrilege and blasphemy. So extreme an inference, having absurdity written on its face, ought to make every honest searcher doubtful as to the certainty of the premisses that can lead up to such a conclusion.

These premisses are the two phrases: "peccati obligationem non inducunt" and "obligationem ad peccatum mortale vel veniale inducere." As to the former, Dr. Littledale does not offer any reply to my explanation, viz.: that the meaning of the genitive case, being remarkably elastic, depends on the context. *But, by omitting, in his second translation, the entire heading in which this phrase occurs, he virtually acknowledges that I am right.* I need not, therefore, insist upon this explanation at great length. Suffice it to observe that, in the mouth of a miscreant, the phrase "obligationem peccati" might possibly mean "an obligation to commit sin"; while on the other hand, when the phrase appears at the head of a grave document full of godly expressions and instinct with the love of perfection, its true meaning must be gathered from "the whole scope and context of the chapter in dispute," and especially from the meaning of the second phrase.

As to this second phrase, is Dr. Littledale's contention justifiable? He speaks as one versed in the "formal and accredited" phraseology of the Roman Catholic Church. Probably he has more experience of our theologians and canonists than any other writer who has never been a Roman Catholic; but after

all, his knowledge cannot compare with that of any of our fairly learned priests. He dips into our books only to find flaws in them, and that, of course, only by way of occasional controversy. We thumb these books daily. They are our manuals. More particularly, with regard to the text of the Constitutions of the Society of Jesus, a Jesuit priest, who is bound by rule to read them over and over again, and who—be it said in all gratitude—is sweetly allured thereto by the perfume of holiness which they breathe, ought assuredly to be more familiar with that text than any outsider. Just as lawyers and judges are the best exponents of law texts, so Catholic theologians are the safest authority as to the meaning of Catholic texts, and Jesuits as to the meaning of Jesuit laws. This being my vantage-ground, I deny that the “formal and accredited phrase,” in the sense I am defending, “has *invariably* the preposition ‘*sul*’ and not ‘*ad*.’” What I deny is the invariableness of the formula. I am far from denying that it is the more common phrase. But I do maintain that the phrase “obligationem *ad* peccatum” is sometimes used when the meaning is “a binding unto sin,” i. e., “an obligation extending as far as sin,” “an obligation under pain of incurring guilt,” “the being rendered liable to the guilt of sin.”

This contention I support by another passage from our Constitutions. In Part 9, chap. V., parag. 6, where provision is made for possible contingencies in which the General of the Society could not attend to his duties, and in which, consequently, the Society, as a body, would have to decide what should be done, the following passage occurs: “*Si ageretur de dignitate, quam ut plurimum pati non potest Praepositi officium, si non compulerit talis obedientia Summi Pontificis, quae ad peccatum obligare posset, res in consultationem ne adducatur; sed id omnino tamquam certum tenendum est, nec debere, nec posse consensum ad hujusmodi dignitatem admittendam praestari;*” the English of which is: “If there were question of a dignity, which is in a general way incompatible with the General’s office, if compulsion be not brought to bear [upon the Society] by such obedience to the Sovereign Pontiff as might *bind unto sin*, let not the affair be debated; but this must by all means be held as certain that consent to the acceptance of such a dignity neither should nor can be given.” The context here plainly indicates the sense of the disputed phrase. Suppose the Pope desired to make the General of the Society a bishop or a cardinal, so long as the Holy Father does not transform his wish into a command binding under pain of sin, the Society should not give its consent to the accepting of any such dignity. Here there can be no possible

question of "committing" any sin, and yet the very same phrase, "ad peccatum obligare," is employed. The only question is whether an ecclesiastical dignity shall or shall not meet with acceptance. This acceptance cannot be construed as sinful. Therefore, the phrase cannot, by any evil-minded translator, be made to mean that the Pope can oblige one to commit the sin of accepting. Consequently, it must mean simply that the Pope can bind "under pain of" sin.

That this is the only legitimate translation of the phrase is made evident by the parallel passage in the 5th paragraph of the 4th chapter of the same 9th Part, where the disputed phrase is rendered by the synonymous one, containing the very preposition so peremptorily required by Dr. Littledale, viz., "sub poena peccati." I quote the passage, and then translate it:

"Si quis urgeret (licet eum non obligando *sub poena peccati*) ut dignitatem aliquam admitteret, in qua Praepositi officium necessario relinquendum esset, non posset sine consensu Societatis eam admittere. Societas autem, semper intiendo quae ad majus Dei obsequium et gloriam pertinent, si obedientia Sedis Apostolicae non compulerit, assensum nunquam praestabit." "If anyone were to urge [the General] (though not binding him *under pain of sin*) to accept some dignity, which would necessarily imply the relinquishing of the office of General, he could not accept it without the consent of the Society. And the Society, always having in view what pertains to the greater service and glory of God, if obedience to the Apostolic See do not compel it, shall never give consent."

The reader will observe, by the way, in these two extracts, that pregnant use of the genitive which I referred to in the phrase "peccati obligationem," "a binding unto (or as far as) sin." Here also we have "obedientia summi Pontificis" and "obedientia Sedis Apostolicae," when the meaning manifestly is "obedience to" the Pope, and not "the obedience of" the Pope, which would be absurd.

With the above proofs to overweigh it, Dr. Littledale's whole plea in bar of my translation falls to the ground. However, there remain a few secondary points to be briefly rectified.

Dr. Littledale says that his translation "alone squares with the Latin idiom." To this I would reply: 1st. That the blunders I have called attention to in several of his renderings rather detract from the value of his opinions about Latin idiom, unless, indeed, these blunders be voluntary, and in that case no assertion of his can deserve respect. 2ndly. All complete dictionaries of the Latin language give, as one of the

meanings of *obligare*, "to render liable through guilt, to make guilty." Thus Cicero, *Pro Domo sua*, 8, says to Clodius: "Quum populum Romanum scelere obligasses," "after you had made the Roman people liable to the guilt of [your] crime." From this meaning of the verb may easily be inferred a cognate meaning of the derived substantive, "obligatio," which, when coupled with "ad peccatum" would then express "the being rendered liable to the guilt of sin." 3rdly. The Latin idiom we are here concerned with is not classical Latin, but Church Latin. Of this we, Roman Catholic priests, who use nothing but that idiom in our most important studies, and who handle it in a thousand ways all through our lives as a truly living language, have a right to claim a thorough knowledge. I have just given two extracts proving that the phrase does "square with the Latin idiom" of the Church.

In my earlier strictures on Dr. Littledale's translation, as it first appeared in the *Ottawa Evening Journal* of May 18th last, I pointed out how his version leads directly down to the absurd conclusion that the vow of chastity obliges those who take it to commit sin. Dr. Littledale's reply is twofold. He says my "apparent refutation breaks down:" first, because "the obvious purport of the clause as to the four vows is meant to put them entirely out of the debateable area, and to rule that no exceptions or relaxations of them can be anyhow taken into account." This is all very fine as a piece of ingenuity calculated to throw dust in people's eyes; but, as an answer, it is worthless.

Dr. Littledale interprets the chapter, which is, I must repeat, one long sentence, as meaning that the Jesuit may never be obliged to commit sin except when commanded in a special manner. But there is a previous exception, that of the four vows, and it is precisely parallel to the other exception. What right has he, then, to discriminate between the two? No; the vows are not "entirely out of the debateable area"; they are exactly on the same plane as the command in virtue of obedience. On his theory, if the latter may lead to sin, so may the former. On my view, which I have proved the only tenable one, both that special command and the vows bind under pain of sin. Moreover, Dr. Littledale's small talk about "exceptions or relaxations" is quite beside the mark. The entire chapter may be searched in vain for any hint about "exceptions or relaxations" of the Constitutions or of anything else. It all turns upon the binding force of the Constitutions.

The second part of Dr. Littledale's reply I have, at the beginning of this paper, acknowledged to be very ingenious. I

regret that I cannot return his other compliment to me and add that it is plausible. "There are," he says, "conceivable situations when the observance of some of the rules might conflict with other precepts. Put the case of the sovereign of a kingdom who was also the last heir of line, and where a failure in the succession would involve a change of dynasty, or even of allegiance, highly dangerous to the country: it is plain that the king who decided to hold by a vow of celibacy might be sinning very gravely against his public duties, which made him incompetent to pledge himself in such a fashion; and thus a vow of chastity might be sinful." Was I exaggerating when I called this a far-fetched instance? What have the personal difficulties of Kings to do with the conscientious perplexities of Jesuits? No man ever was King and Jesuit at the same time. John Casimir had been a Jesuit and a Cardinal, though apparently never in holy orders and consequently never bound by a solemn vow of chastity; but he was legitimately dispensed and ceased to be a Jesuit before becoming King of Poland and before marrying. If such a complication as Dr. Littledale contemplates were ever to occur to a Jesuit, the man would have either to leave the Society or to abdicate the proffered kingdom. Should the Pope judge, as Dr. Littledale does, that our perplexed Jesuit King is bound to marry, he can give him the requisite dispensation. But Popes are very loath to do so.

A case so very like Dr. Littledale's that he may have had it in mind and simply transferred it to the Society, actually occurred to a Cardinal Archbishop, who was not a Jesuit. Henry, uncle to Sebastian, King of Portugal, who perished in Africa, found himself, as Cardinal and Archbishop of Braga and Evora, the last heir of his line. He ascended the throne of Portugal in 1578. His having no issue actually did involve a change of dynasty and even of allegiance: for Philip II, King of Spain, took possession of Portugal after Henry's death. This Henry probably foresaw, and, at the urgent entreaties of his advisers, asked the Pope for a dispensation in order that he might marry. Gregory XIII gently but firmly refused, and so effectually won over Henry to his view that the latter ever afterwards resisted the solicitations of his parliament asking him to renew his request.

The case is the same as Dr. Littledale's; but the Pope's decision is a direct reversal of Dr. Littledale's. At any rate such cases are not even "conceivable" for one who remains a Jesuit; and the introduction thereof in lieu of a reply speaks volumes for the weakness of Dr. Littledale's cause.

In his last paragraph he becomes still weaker. Instead of sticking to the point, which alone I had touched (see page 5, line 34),

he flies off to general accusations, which have been answered scores of times; and yet he admits that, if those accusations are not true, his case as to the meaning he puts upon that one disputed clause fails. This is a very precious avowal. So it amounts to this: if Jesuits do not hold elsewhere that the "end justifies the means," it cannot be proved that they hold it in their Constitutions. This point is all I argued for. *The present controversy hinges on those Constitutions and on nothing else.* I have no time to re-write, for Dr. Littledale's benefit, Fr. James Jones' admirable answer to him, entitled "Dishonest Criticism" (London: Hodges, 1887), nor the crushing replies about Busembaum, Wagemann and Gury in the early numbers of "The Month" for 1875 (London), which have been reappearing for some weeks past in the *Northwest Review* of Winnipeg; nor have I time to enlarge upon the obvious rejoinder about those who expelled the Jesuits, that they were either blinded by ignorant prejudice or swayed by immorality and impiety.

However, for just one little point there is time. "And I say this," quoth Dr. Littledale, "having myself had Jesuit friends whom I would have trusted confidently in any relation of life where their specific obligations did not intervene." Yes, Dr. Littledale, you may "have had" friends amongst us. I pass over the sneer with which you hint that they were not to be trusted when their specific obligations intervened. It is part of your present stock-in-trade: groundless insinuation. In the past you would have scorned such meanness. I have known all those Jesuits who are likely to have been your friends. They are, under all circumstances, as true as steel. It is not they who have changed; it is you. All of them who have ever spoken of you have echoed the "*Quantum mutatus ab illo!*" How woe-fuilly altered from that Dr. Littledale who, some twenty years ago, at the eleventh anniversary of the A. P. U. C., preached a sermon on reunion in which he drew a noble picture of the Roman Church, saying that "the zeal of her priests, her monks and her nuns, the faith and holiness of her leaders remain undiminished!" As you neared the goal, you swerved and went back. Had you taken the decisive step of personal reunion, you would have become as a little child to enter the kingdom of heaven. You could not have lorded it over well-meaning multitudes as a sort of independent Pope who is neither Catholic nor Protestant, who, while celebrating "daily with wafer and chasuble," brings out, under the auspices of the S. P. C. K., successive editions of the "Plain Reasons," which are honeycombed with retractations without acknowledgment, with specimens of unfair

controversy, with misquotations, misrepresentations, misstatements and mistranslations, all tending to paint the Church of Rome as a lying, idolatrous, cruel and rapacious tyrant. (See Ryder's "Catholic Controversy," Index, article "Littledale:" New York, Catholic Publication Society Co.) The glory of thus unsettling honest minds would not, indeed, have been yours, had you remained trustworthy and true; but, as an everlasting compensation, your splendid gifts would have found their proper channel in the loyal service of God, instead of being worse than wasted, and you could look forward with clean lips and heart to the judgment-seat of Christ.

LEWIS DRUMMOND, S. J.

St. Boniface, Manitoba, August 20th, 1889.

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RECEIVED TEXT (1869).

Quod Constitutiones peccati obligationem non inducunt.

Cum exoptet Societas universas suas Constitutiones, Declarationes, et Ordines, omnino jure declinando, statutum, nihil illi se declinando observari; optetque vel certe adjuvare omnes secures nullius peccati, quod ex vi Constitutionum hujusmodi, aut Ordinationum proveniat, incidant; visum est nobis in Domino, excepto expresso voto, quo Societas summo Pontifici pro tempore existenti tenetur, ac tribus essentialibus, nullas Constitutiones, Declarationes, vel ordinem ullum vivendi, posse obligationem ad peccatum mortale vel veniale inducere; nisi Superior ea in nomine Domini nostri Jesu Christi, vel in virtute obedientiae jubeat: quod in rebus, vel personis illis, in quibus judicabitur, quod ad particulare minusque, vel ad universale bonum multum conveniet, succedat amor et desiderium omnis perfectionis; et ut major gloria et laus Christi Creatoris ac Domini nostri consequatur.

DR. LITTLEDALE'S FIRST TRANSLATION (MAY 1889.)

That the Constitutions involve no obligation to commit sin.

Although the Society desires all its Constitutions, Declarations, and order of life to be observed according to our institute, in no wise deviating in any matter; it is nevertheless fitting that all its members should be at liberty to decline against falling into the snare of any sin, which may arise from the force of its Constitutions or injunctions: It seems good to us in the Lord that, excepting the express Vow whereby the Society is bound to the Supreme Pontiff for the time being, and the three essential vows of Poverty, Chastity, and Obedience, no Constitutions, Declarations or any order of living can involve obligation to sin mortal or venial: unless the Superior command them in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, or in the virtue of holy obedience; wherein it shall be done in order to contribute greatly to the particular good of each singly, or that of all; and instead of the fear of offence, let the love and desire of all perfection succeed: that the greater glory and praise of Christ our Creator and Lord may follow.

DR. LITTLEDALE'S SECOND TRANSLATION (JULY 1889).

N. B.—The corrections introduced without acknowledgment, after reading Fr. D.'s translation, are italicized.

[Heading not translated.]

Although the Society desires all its Constitutions, Declarations and order of life to be observed in every respect according to our Institute, with no deviation in any matter; it is nevertheless fitting that all its members should be at liberty to decline against falling into the snare of any sin, which may arise from the force of its Constitutions or injunctions. *It has seemed good to us in the Lord that, excepting the express vow by which the Society is bound to the Supreme Pontiff for the time being, and the three other essential vows of Poverty, Chastity and Obedience, no Constitutions, Declarations or any order of living can involve obligation to sin mortal or venial; unless the Superior command them in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, or in virtue of holy obedience; which may be done in those cases or persons wherein it shall be judged that it will greatly conduce to the particular good of each, or the general advantage: and instead of the fear of offence, let the love and desire of all perfection succeed, that the greater glory and praise of Christ our Creator and Lord may ensue.*

FR. DRUMMOND'S TRANSLATION (JUNE 1889).

That the Constitutions do not involve a binding under penalty of sin.

Whereas the Society earnestly desires all its Constitutions, Declarations and order of life to be observed altogether according to our Institute, in no wise deviating in any matter; whereas, nevertheless, it also desires that all its members should be safe, or at least aided, against falling into the snare of any sin, which may arise from the force of such Constitutions or ordinances; it has seemed good to us in the Lord that, excepting the express vow whereby the Society is bound to the Supreme Pontiff existing at the time, and the three other essential vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, no constitutions, declarations, nor any order of living can involve an obligation extending as far as a binding under penalty of a liability to the guilt of mortal or venial sin; unless the Superior command them in the name of Our Lord Jesus Christ or in virtue of obedience: which may be done in those cases or persons wherein it shall be judged that it will contribute greatly to the particular good of each singly, or to that of all; and let the love and desire of all perfection take the place of the dread of offending; that the greater glory and praise of Christ our Creator and Lord may follow.

LATIN ORIGINAL.

N.B.—The words that distinctly exclude sin are in capitals. The other words untranslated by Dr. L. are in italics.

23. Expedit in primis ad profectum, et valde necessarium est, ut omnes perfectae obedientiae se dedant, Superiori (quicumque ille sit) loco Christi Domini nostri agnoscentes, et interna reverentia et amoris non prosequentes: nec solum in executione externa, cum, quae injungit, integre, prompte, fortiter et cum humilitate debita, sine excusationibus et obmurmurationibus obediunt, licet difficilia et secundum sensualitatem repugnantia jubeat: verum etiam conentur interius resignationem, et *veram abnegationem* propriae voluntatis et iudicii habere: *voluntatem ac iudicium suum cum eo, quod Superior vult et sentit, in omnibus rebus* **(UBI PECCATUM NON CERNERETUR)** omnino conformantes. Proposita sibi voluntate ac iudicio Superioris pro regula suae voluntatis et iudicii, quo exactius conformantur primae ac secundae regulae omnis bonae voluntatis et iudicii, quae est aeterna bonitas et sapientia.

24. Et ut magis in obedientiae virtute se exercent, conentur, atque etiam valde necessarium est, ut non solum Superiori Societatis, vel domus, sed etiam subordinatis officialibus, qui ex illo auctoritatem acciperunt, in *is omnibus, in quibus super ipsos prelati fuerint, obediunt*: et assenscant non intueri, quis ille sit, cui obediunt: sed potius quis ille, propter quem, et cui in omnibus obediunt, qui est Christus Dominus.

DR. LITTLEDALE'S GARBLED TRANSLATION.

N. B.—The omission, indicated by the blank, covers the capitalized words which run, Dr. Little-dale's whole case, and about which he prudently keeps silence in his second letter.

It is especially conducive to improvement, and very necessary, that all should yield themselves up to perfect obedience, recognising Christ our Lord, (whoever he may be) as in the place of Christ our Lord, and regarding him with inward reverence and affection, nor merely obeying him in the outward execution of his injunctions fully, promptly, vigorously and with fitting humility, without excuses or murmurings, though he may command things hard and repugnant to their feelings; but shall also strive to have inwardly resignation of their own will and judgment

Translation based upon the English "Rules of the Society of Jesus" (Roehampton, 1875).

N. B.—Dr. Littledale's omissions are generally italicized, the most important capitalized.

It chiefly conduces to advancement, and is very necessary, that all should give themselves to perfect Obedience, acknowledging the Superior (whoever he be) in place of Christ our Lord, and yielding him inward reverence and love: and they must not only obey him in performing exteriorly the things which he enjoins, entirely, readily, constantly, and with due humility, without excuses and murmurings, though he may command things hard and repugnant to sensuality; but also they must endeavor to resign their own will and judgment; *conforming their will and judgment wholly to what the Superior wills and judges in all things* **WHEREIN SIN COULD NOT BE DIS-**

CERNED. *Proposing to themselves the will and judgment of the Superior, as a rule of their will and judgment; that they may be the more exactly conformed to the first and chiefest rule of every good will and judgment, which is the Eternal Goodness and Wisdom. And in order that they may exercise themselves the more in the virtue of obedience, it is fitting, and even it is very necessary that they should obey, not only the Superior of the Society or House, but also the subordinate Officers, who have received authority from him, in all those things in which these latter have power over them; and they must accustom themselves to behold, not who he is whom they obey, but rather Who He is for Whose sake, and Whom they obey in all, that is, Christ the Lord.*

and they are to accustom themselves not to consider who it is whom they obey, but rather Him for Whom and to Whom they obey in all things, which is Christ the Lord.